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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE
OF

No. 8809

HILLARD L. VOORHEES,
Deceased.

RESP·ONDENT'S' BRIEF
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
This matter is before the Supreme Court by way of
an appeal from a so-called interlocutory order, the Court
having granted the petition of Pearl 0. Voorhees to review an order of the District Court of Sanpete County,
State of Utah, appointing Tracy-Collins Trust Company
as successor administrator in the above entitled estate.
The order involved was made after a hearing by the Court
and upon the entry of Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, which Findings and Conclusions are not assailed
in connection with this appeal.

1
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For convenience, Respondents will use the samE
designation as Appellant in referring to the various par.
ties and the record.
The statement of facts set forth by Appellant in her
brief on file herein are substantially correct. However,
Respondents desire to correct what appear to be one or
two misleading statements contained in the Statement of
Facts. At Page 4 of Appellant's Brief appears the statement that "at the request of Respondents" Walker Bank
and Trust Company filed its rejection of appointment as
successor administrator. It was not at the request of Respondents that Walker Bank and Trust Company refused
to qualify, but on its own initiative that the rejection was
filed. The rejection (R. 99) states no reason for refusing
to qualify. However, the evidence in the case indicates
(and the lower Court so found), that the reason the
\V alker Bank and Trust Company elected not to qualify
was that it did not desire to get involved in litigation
which appeared would be necessary to marshal the assets
belonging to the estate. (Tr. 111) The further reference
on Page-l of Appellant's Brief to the Order issued by the
trial court directing .A.ppellant to appear and show cause
wh~T she should not be found in contempt for failing to
file her accounting of the estate within the time originally
n'qnired h~T the court is not material to this appeal. It is
on]~· PYidt'llee of the fact that the ~\ppellant in this case
had act Pd "·it hout notiee to the Respondents in obtaining
from 11H' court an <.'xtension of time to file her accounting.
HPspondents \n'n' not aware at the time of filing their
mot ion for an Order to Show Cause that the time for sub•)
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mitting the accounting of Appellant as Administratix had
been extended. Counsel for Appellant had obtained such
extension without advising Respondents and without
obtaining a stipulation therefor. The failure to file the
accounting was not urged at the time of the hearing before
the court on December 16th; nor was such failure to file
in any way involved in the Court's determination to appoint Tracy - Collins Trust Company as successor
administrator.
On Page 5 of her Brief, Appellant states that the
order appointing the successor administrator was "modified by the letter of the judge of the Court below dated
December 24, 1957." The letter was not a modification of
the order dated December 16, 1957, but was a notice to
counsel for the respective parties that in entering the
order which had been submitted by Respondents herein,
the Court had corrected what was obviously a typographical error when it changed the word "partiality" to "impartiality" (R. 117). The Court's letter to counsel (a
copy of which appears at Page 165 of the Record) recites
that "under date December 23, 1957, I signed and filed
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order
mailed to me by Arthur H. Nielsen with the following
qualifications :
"In Paragraph 9 of the Findings, line 3, I change,d
the word 'partiality' to 'impartiality' to conform with the
order entered since the same seemed to be a typographical
error and not consistent with the order."
3
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The Court in the same letter indicated that in its oral
pronouncement from the bench, as well as in the minuteE
of the proceedings of December 16th, it had referred to
Tracy-Collins Trust Company as Tracy Loan and Trust
Company, and therefore that the minutes were being corrected nunc pro tunc to show that Tracy-Collins Trust
Company was the name of the successor administrator
being appointed.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
Appellant has raised t\YO points to the effect that (1)
Appellant had the preferential right to designate the
administrator, notwithstanding her resignation or removal; and ( 2) In any event, the Walker Bank and Trust
Company should have been appointed the successor
administrator.
Respondents submit that before this Court should
consider the matter on the merits, it should determine the
issue rnised on the Petition for an Intermediate Appeal
that an Order appointing an ~ldministrator is not an
Interlocutory Order and therefore the Petition should be
dismi~~~ed. A determination by the Court of this problem
'iVill b(' of gren t assistance to attorneys in determining
what 1~ a final order for purposl's of appeal.
In the eYent this Court should deem it appropriate to
the mnttL'f on the nwrits. Respondents claim:

co:n~idt•r

1. At the time the Court appointed Tracy-Collins

Trw·d t \m1pnny as succl'ssor administrator of the estate,
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Appellant did not have a preferential statutory right to
designate the appointment of an administrator.
2. Regardless of whether Appellant did or did not
have a preferential statutory right to designate an administrator, the Court did not err in refusing to appoint
Walker Bank and Trust Company under the facts and circumstances and the evidence in this case.
These points will be considered in that order.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
AT THE TIME THE COURT APPOINTED TRACYCOLLINS TRUST COMPANY AS SUCCESSOR ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE, APPELLANT DID
NOT HAVE A PREFERENTIAL STATUTORY RIGHT
TO DESIGNATE THE APPOINTMENT OF AN ADMINISTRATOR.

Although the question whether Appellant had a preferential right to designate the appointment of a successor
administrator is primarily one of law, we wish to point
out that the Findings of the Court below in respect to the
facts are not assailed on appeal and are therefore binding
and conclusive upon this Court. We call attention to this
matter for the reason that Appellant seems to ignore the
fact that the following Findings were made by the Court :
'' 5. From the evidence thus adduced the
Court finds that the said Pearl 0. Voorhees has
failed properly to administer said estate and has
neglected to account for property which appears

5
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to belong thereto and has asserted and now assert1
adverse interests and claims to the estate.''
"7. Thereafter on the 6th day of December
1957, said Walker Bank & Trust Company filec
herein its Rejection of the appointment as Sue
cessor Administrator. The Court finds that said
Rejection was based upon the ground and for thE
reason that the said Walker Bank and Trust Company, because of the policy which it has and upon
advice of its counsel, did not desire to take affirmative steps to collect assets that might belong to the
estate where an adverse claim thereto exists on
the part of the said Pearl 0. Voorhees; that the
said Walker Bank and Trust Company desired
only to serve as a "stake holder" and not to act
for the best interests of the estate as required
by law."
'' 9. The Court finds that the said Tracy-Collins Trust Company is in all respects competent to
act as Administrator and will act with fairness
and impartiality; that in order to prevent further
delay which may result in waste or lost to the
estate it is necessary immediately to appoint an
Administrator; and that there is no legal reason
why the said Tracy-Collins Trust Company should
not be appointed Succeessor Administrator."

"10. By reason of her acts and conduct, and
reason of the Rejecrion filed by the \\~alker
Bank and Trust Company the request of Pearl 0.
Voorhees for the appointment of \Yalker Bank and
Trust Compan~· should not be granted if the said
Trney-Collins Trust Company will proceed immedintt>l~· to qualify.·· (R. 116, 117)
h~·

rrhl'~l'

findillg'S being conclusiYe upon the matter
i nsof:1 r n s this a ppcal is concerned, the question whether
6
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Pearl 0. Voorhees is entitled to nominate or designate a
succesesor administrator must be resolved by a determination of whether a person otherwise disqualified from
acting in the estate by the reason of neglect of the affairs
of the estate can nevertheless exercise a preferential
right to appoint a successor under the provisions of Section 75-6-3, U.C.A., 1953. This section reads as follows:
''In case of the removal, resignation, or death
of one of several Executors or Administrators, the
Court, if it deems it necessary, may appoint a successor or may permit the remaining executor or
executors, administrator or administrators, to
complete the execution of the trust. In case of the
death, resignation or removal of all, the Court
shaU, upon notice, issue Letters to the person having the prior right thereto, or to any competent
person named by the person having such prior
right ... " (Emphasis supplied)
Appellant's position as stated on Page 9 of her brief
is that the revocation of Letters of Administration "could
not constitute a waiver or a legal deprivation of the preferential right of the Appellant to nominate the successor
administrator of the estate.'' In doing so, Appellant
relies upon the italicized portion of the foregoing quotation to the effect that upon removal of an administrator,
the Court shall issue Letters to the person "having the
prior right thereto, or to any competent person named hy
the person having such prior right.''

It is Respondents' position that where a person has
lost the right to act as an Administrator because of conduct which is against the interests of the estate, that such
7
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person also loses the right to designate a successor
administrtor. It is Respondents' further contention that
the reference in the italicized portion of Section 75-6-3,
quoted above, to "the person having the prior right
thereto" is to the next person who would, in the order
named in Section 75-4-1, U.C.A., 1953, have the right to
be appointed Administrator upon the removal of someone with a more preferential right. Thus, if a surviving
husband or wife (who by the last-named section has the
first right to be appointed administrator) is removed,
then the person having the prior right to appointment as
administrator would be the children, and such children
would have the right to serve or to designate the administrator to serve, as the case may be.
Appellant apparently takes the position that because
Letters of Administration heretofore issued to her were
revoked by the trial court upon stipulation of counsel,
~he did not lose any preferential right for the designation of the appointment of a successor administrator.
However, Appellant fails to recognize that in the initial
petition filed by Respondents herein, it was alleged that
the conduct on the part of Appellant "has constituted a
nPglcrt and mismanagement of the affairs of the estate,
and a wa~h' of the property of Decedent, so that Letters
of ,\dministration to the said Pearl 0. Yoorhees should
he immediately revoked.'' (R. 30) The Court -was reqtH'S1.l'd to issue" Letters of Administration to 'Valker
nnnk and rl,rnst Compan~T· (R. 29)
At thP lwaring- of this petition, Appellant through

hPr <'ounsel requested the Court to permit her to resign.

8
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Nothing was said at that time to the effect that Appellant
claimed a right to nominate a successor administrator.
Rather, Appellant acknowledged the right of Respondents to designate such successor by agreeing that the
Walker Bank and Trust Company should be appointed.
At that time it appeared that the Walker Bank and Trust
Company would act with impartiality and aggressively
protect the interests of the estate. It was not until later
(after counsel for Appellant had consulted with Mr. Mortensen, the Trust Officer of the Bank) that the Bank
became concerned and determined that it would rather
act in the capacity of a "stake holder." (Tr. p. 132, 133)
Even after Appellant requested permission to resign,
the Court commented:
"If she is going to stipulate to her attorney
she will resign, that is one thing. vVhether the
court will force her to is another thing." (Tr. 31)

It was at this juncture that her counsel stated that:
"She is willing to resign, Your Honor, and
consents that vValker Bank and Trust Company be
appointed in her stead." (Tr. 32) (Emphasis
supplied)
Although Letters of Administration to Appellant
were revoked upon stipulation of counsel rather than
upon a hearing and determination by the Court of h<-'r
failure properly to conduct herself as administrator
nevertheless, under the facts found by the Court after the'
hearing on December 16, 1957, she had lost her right not
only to be appointed an administrator of the estate of her
9
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deceased husband, but also to nominate an administratoJ
to be appointed. Chapter 4 of Title 75 dealing with th«
issuance of Letters of Administration not only provide~
to whom Letters of Administration may issue ( Sectior
75-4-1), but also provides who is incompetent to act aE
an administrator. Section 75-4-4 provides as follows:
''No person is competent or entitled to serve
as administrator or administratrix who is either:
"(1) Under the age of majority or an incompetent person; but in such cases letters must be
granted to his or her guardian, or, in the discretion of the court, to any person entitled to
administration;
'' (2) Not a bona fide resident of the state; but
if the person entitled to serve is not a resident of
the state, he may request the court or judge to
appoint a resident of the state to serve as administrator, and such person may be appointed;
'' ( 3) Convicted of an infamous crime;
'' ( 4) Adjudged by the Court incompetent to
e.rccute tll e duties of tlze trust by reason of drunkenness, improvidence. or zra nt of understanding
or integrity; or,

' ' ( 5) The survidng partner of a firm of
which the decedent was a member.'' (Emphasis
supplied)
The trial court hy its Findings numbered 5 and 10
(lH'l't>inabo,·p quoted) has determined that ~lppellant is
iucom} ll't l'Ilt to cxecnh' the duties of trust by reason of her
lack of inh'grity in administering properly the affairs of
tltt' <>~tatl' so that ~he hn~ no right to be appointed admini:-1t rntrix of tht' e~tnte under ~uch conditions. Nor does

10
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the above section give her the right to nominate a substitute administrator as it does in the case of persons who
are under the age of majority, incompetent persons, or
non-residents of the state. Because no provision is made
for the recognition of any right of a person adjudged by
the court to be incompetent under the provisions of subdivision (4), then under the maxim of expressio unius est
exclusio alterius it must be concluded that the legislative
intent was· to preclude such persons from having the right
to make a substitute designation. See 50 Am. Jur.,
STATUTEs, Sec. 244.
While Section 75-4-4 provides for the exclusion of
persons from appointment to the office of an administrator where such person is incompetent by reason of certain
alleged acts, Setcion 75-6-1 provides for the removal of
such an individual as an administrator where it appears
that subsequent to his appointment, he has been guilty of
''neglect, mismanagement, waste, embezzlement, incompetency,'' etc.
In the present instance there was no reason initially
to suspect that Appellant would not act in the capacity of
Administratrix with fidelity and to the best interests of
the estate. Subsequent to her appointment, it became
apparent by reason of the failure to account to the Court
for considerable items of property, which it appeared
had belonged to the decedent during his lifetime, that ~he
was not acting for the best interests of the estate, nor was
she acting with integrity in connection with the administration thereof. It therefore became necessary for Re11
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spondents to file a petition to have her removed and, but
for her voluntary resignation, the Court obviously
would have had cause to remove her under the evidence
in the case. Upon her removal - whether for cause or
by stipulation of counsel- she became and was incompetent to designate or nominate a succeessor administrator under the provisions of Section 75-4-4, and 75-6-1
above referred to.
We submit that upon the removal of an administrator, it is not possible for the Court immediately to reappoint such person upon the alleged theory that such
person has a ''prior right'' to be appointed administrator under the provisions of Section 75-4-1, U.C.A., 1953.
Since such person has lost the right to be appointed personally, the person has likewise lost the right to nominate a successor by reason of the provisions of Section
75-6-3, U.C.A., 1953, which provides that the Court shall,
upon notice, issue letters to the person having the prior
right thereto, or to any competent person named by the
person having such prior right. If the person has no prior
right to be appointed personally, then such person has no
prior right to name a successor. It is only in the case
where the person has a ri~ht to be appointed himself that
he can successfully claim the right to designate someone
else in his stead.
The cases cited b~· Appellant in respect to the exercise of the right to designate an administrator are all
cases in which the person designating the administrator
had not lost or forfeited any preferential right to be
appointed personally as administrator.
1:2
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In the case of In Re Pingree's Estate (1929) 74 Utah
384, 279 Pac. 901, the trial court denied the widow her
preferential right to be appointed administratrix which
was reversed by this Court, stating that because the trial
court had found the widow to be a ''competent person to
be charged with the administration of the affairs of the
estate" it could not deny her right to appointment "in
the absence of showing some good and sufficient reason to
the contrary." In the instant matter the trial court has
not only found that Appellant is not a competent person
to be charged with the administration of the affairs of
the estate, but it has also found good and sufficient reason
why neither she nor the Walker Bank and Trust Company
(subsequently designated by her) should be appointed.
Again in the case of InRe Johnson Estate, (1934) 84
Utah 168, 35 P. 2d 305, the Supreme Court affirmed the
right of a widow to be appointed administratrix of the
estate of her deceased husband ''as a matter of right, in
the absence of showing some good and sufficient reason
to the contrary.''
The case of In Re Martin Estates (1946) 109 Utah
131, 166 P. 2d 197, is not in point because it involves a
situation where a married daughter nominated an administrator of the estate when by statute she was not permitted to act because of her marital status. There the
Court said:
"Even though the statute declares them to be
incompetent to administer an estate, infants and
incompetents, through guardians, and non-resident heirs may exercise the right of nomination
under the statute.''
13
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The Court went on to place a married woman in the
same category as infants and incompetents and authorized her to nominate an administrator, although she herself could not serve because of her marital status. Obviously, this case does not have any bearing upon the
issues before the Court now for the reason that we are
not concerned with the marital status which disqualifies
the party from acting, but neglect, and other conduct on
the part of Appellant which made her incompetent to
serve as Administratrix.
Though our Supreme Court has never passed on the
precise issue presented by this appeal, it has nevertheless
been called upon to consider the sufficiency of evidence
to justify the trial court in removing an administrator
of an estate under the provisions of Section 75-6-1, hereinbefore quoted. In the case of In Re Robison's Estate,
59 Utah 431, 204 Pac. 321, the sur\iving widow had initially petitioned for the appointment of a nephew as
administrator of the estate of her deceased husband. Following the filing of the Inventory and ~\ppraisement by
the administrator certain heirs petitioned the court for
rp,·ocation of Letters of Administration because the admillistrator had "wrongfully and unlawfully left out of
the said inYentor~· and appraisement certain property belonging to the estate.'' The petition further alleged that
tho administrator had permitted the widow to have posS(~ssioll of certain property which in truth and in fact
l><'long-rd to the estate. At the close of the testimony
oiT<'r<'<l i11 support of the petition seeking removal of the
administrntor, the trial court granted a motion for non-

14
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suit from which the heirs appealed. In reversing the lower
court and remanding the matter for further evidence and
determination, the Supreme Court held that the evidence
submitted was such as to require the trial court to determine the sufficiency thereof on the merits. The Court
went on to point out that it was the duty of the administrator to make and return to the Court a true Inventory
and Appraisement of all of the estate which has come to
his possession or knowledge. The fact that the administrator had permitted the widow to obtain possession of
certain property without taking any action in respect
thereto was sufficient evidence to require the lower court
to ''hear any testimony offered on the part of Respondent,
if any was offered, or, if none were offered, to make Findings of Fact upon the testimony before it.'' The Supreme
Court stated that the ruling of the lower court on the
motion for non-suit had to be considered in connection
with the legal effect of such a motion, and in that light
the court was clearly wrong in granting the motion for
non-suit.
Except for the amount of property which has not
been reported, the facts in the instant matter might to
some extent be said to be analogous to the facts in the
Robison Case. Here, Appellant originally filed an Inventory and Appraisement which listed property and assets
of the approximate value of $10,000.00. Within a few
days after the filing of the petition by Respondents to
have Appellant removed as administratrix, a supplemental inventory was filed in which Appellant acknowledged that the decedent owned an undivided one-half in-

15
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terest in a partnership between himself and his brother
Henry Voorhees, and further that such partnershii
owned certain equipment which the inventory listed, an(
which was appraised at approximately $2,400.00. Wha1
the supplemental inventory failed to do, however, was tc
report that shortly before the death of the decedent, Mrs.
Voorhees received from the partner, the sum of $5,186.25
which she deposited in her own name in the bank under
"sheep account." (Tr. 8) The amount of this deposit is
shown on Exhibit 1 in evidence. (R. 55) In her testimony,
Mrs. Voorhees admitted that her husband was, during his
lifetime, engaged in a partnership operation with his
brother, Henry. (Tr. 7) Subsequent to the initial deposit
of $5186.25 which l\Irs. Voorhees had received from the
other partner (and in connection with which there was
no testimony that this money had ever been given to her
by her husband), she received an additional sum of
$2,441.34 on or about July 16, 1956 (eight days before her
husband's death). This amount represented one-half of
the incentive payment made to the partnership by the
Commodity Credit Corporation on account of wool sold
during the preceding year and would therefore obnously
belong to her husband and not to ~Irs. Yoorhees (Tr. 17).
See also Exhibit ~. (R. 56) ~\_ppellant also retained cash
in the amount of $10,100.00 which was in the home at the
time her husband died, together with other amounts paid
to lwr husband on indebtednesses owing to him. (Exhibit
12, R. 84) Exhibit 3 reYl'als that during the time the
sheep account remained artiYe in the l\Ianti City Bank
(whirh account wns opened up by ..Appellant in the name
of Penrl 0. Voorhees, or BeYerly D. Clyde, or Betty V.
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Hayward), in excess of $35,000.00 was deposited, all of
which, according to the testimony, came from money or
property or other assets which had belonged to decedent
during his lifetime.
In addition thereto, Appellant claims title as against
the estate to a considerable amount of real property as
well as to the personal property consisting of the interest
in the sheep belonging to the partnership, and all other
interests of the decedent in the partnership other than
to the personal equipment listed in the supplemental
inventory.

It is further significant to point out that even after
the hearing on the petition to have Mrs. Voorhees removed as administratrix, and on or about the lOth of
January, 1958, Mrs. Voorhees filed a further supplemental inventory and appraisement in which certain
additional property was listed as belonging to the estate.
(R.157) Part of the property listed therein was property
which Petitioners in their original petition alleged was
not accounted for by Appellant and had been wrongfully
retained by her.
This evidence, in the light of the decision of this
Court in the Robison Case, supra, to the effect that "District Courts are, and as a matter of necessity must be,
given a wide discretion in the conduct of estates, and
should not be limited or restricted unnecessarily" certainly justified the decision of the trial court in appointing the Tracy-Collins Trust Company as the successor
administrator to Appellant herein.
17
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In a later case, In Re Bogert's Estate, 76 Utah 56€
290 Pac. 947, this Court, again reiterating that the lowe:
court has large discretion in determining whether an exec
utrix should be removed, affirmed a decision of the loweJ
court removing the executrix who claimed money appar
ently belonging to the estate. In so doing, the Cour1
stated:
''As has been seen, our statute gives the cour1
power to revoke the letters of any executor 01
administrator for neglect, mismanagement, waste1
incompetency, incapacity, or for any other reasou
deemed sufficient by the court. The Court appointing an administrator or executor has a very large
discretion in determining whether, upon the facts
presented, the officer shall either be removed or
suspended, and unless it appears that such discretion has been abused, the action of the trial
court will not be disturbed on appeal. Farnsworth
v. Hatch, 47 Utah 62, 151 P. 537; In re Newell's
Estate, 18 Cal. App. 258, 122 P. 1099."
The Court cited the earlier case of Fan1s1cortlz v.
Hatch, 47 Utah 62, 151 Pac. 537, where the Court discusses the authorities on the subject as follows:
"Upon the other hand, counsel for the appellants refer us to cases in which the courts have
removed administrators or executors upon the
ground that their interests conflicted with those of
1lw (•states the~- n--presented. Among the cases
cih'd upon that subject are the following: In re
Gleason's Estate, 17 :l\Iisc. Rep. 510, 41 N.Y. Supp.
418; 1\lnrks Y. Conts, 31 Or. 609, 6~ Pac. 488: Put11<'~- , •• Fletcher, 1-1-8 1\[nss. ~47, 19 N.E. 370; I\Iills
Y. 1\Tills, ~~ Or. ~10, ~n Pac. 443; I\::ellberg's Ap}H'a 1. 86 Pa. 1~~)-133; In re \Vallace, 68 App. DiY.
18
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649, 74 N.Y. Supp. 33. In Marks v. Coates, supra,
the Court, in passing upon the question, says :
'' 'One whose personal interests are in conflict
with his duty as administrator is not a proper person to hold the office.'
"In Putney v. Fletcher, supra, the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts, in the course of the opinion, said:
'' 'An executor or administrator is deemed
unsuitable when he has any conflicting personal
interest which prevents him from doing his official duty.'
''To the same effect are the other cases last
above cited. In the very nature of things such
must be the law. The old proverb, 'No man can
serve two masters,' or;as the Spanish put it, 'He
who has two masters to serve must lie to one of
them,' is as true now as it ever was, and is as applicable in the administration of estates as elsewhere. Indeed, in such matters courts should be
very careful to prevent the claimants or creditors
from passing upon their own claims, where such
claims are being contested. ln. the nature of things
it is not possible for any one to act with perfect
impartiality and fairness in a matter in which he
claims valuable and important interests. That fact
is universally recognized, and especially in our
courts of justice, and the only reason that it is not
always strictly applied is because it is impractical
to do so.'' (Emphasis supplied)
In the Farnsworth Case, the action of the lower court
in refusing to revoke Letters of Administration was reversed, the Supreme Court stating that under all the
facts and circumstances the "lower court should at least
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have requested Respondent to surrender the office of
executrix, and upon her refusal to do so, should promptly
have removed her from office.'' The Court further stated
that under all the facts and circumstances it appeared
"that it would be quite proper for the court to appoint
some suitable and proper person, and one who is satisfactory to the parties in interest, if possible to do, to act
in place of the Respondent.''
If, as is reflected in the decisions of the Robison,
Farnsworth and Bogert Cases, supra, the conduct of
Appellant in this case was such as not only to justify, but
require the Court to request her to resign or to remove
her for cause, then it is Respondents' contention that
Appellant has lost any right to designate her successor.
Certainly, the right of a nominee to be appointed
Administrator of an estate is no greater than the right
of the nominor to be personally appointed administrator.
Such is the ruling of the California Court In re Homer-

rille's Estate, 12 Cal. App. 2d 430, 55 P. 2d 597, where the
Court said:
"A relative is entitled to priority in appointment oni~~ when entitled to succeed to the estate or
some portion thereof (Probate Code, Sec. 422);
and a nominee as such can haYe no greater right
than the person entitled. (In re Estate of ~Iyers,
9 Cnl. App. 694, 100 P. 712; In re Estate of Connick. 189 Cnl. 498, 209 P. 346.) ''
In the Cnse of Iu rc Connick's Estate. 189 Cal. 498,
209 Pac. 356, the Supreme Court of California held:
20
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''The effect of these decisions is not only to
destroy that portion of appellant's contention that
the nominee of a person other than the surviving
husband or wife entitled to administer gains thereby an absolute and irrevocable right to seek such
administration which cannot be affected by the
subsequent change in the status of the nominor;
but it would also seem to follow logically therefrom that the right of such nominee to receive the
appointment as administrator must be determined
by the state of facts existing at the time such appointment is to be made, and if at such time the
nominor has either rightfully withdrawn his nominatipn or has become himself for any reason incompetent or no longer entitled to be appointed
such administrator, the right of his nominee to
receive such appointment must also be held to have
ceased.''
In that case the nominee had been nominated by a
person who had the prior right of appointment but the
nominor had thereafter died. The nominee claimed her
appointment as administratrix should nevertheless be enforced. But the Court held that since the nominor 's right
to be appointed himself had lapsed, so likewise had his
right to designate a successor.
In the case of D. E. Prum's Estate v. Boards, 26 Cal.
App. 2d 319, 79 P. 2d 414, the Court held in determining
the right of a nominee to be appointed Administratrix
of the estate, that such nominee, insofar as any adverse
interest to the estate is concerned, must be treated as
standing in the same position as the nominor. Thus in
the instant case, if the Walker Bank and Trust Company
is to be considered to be the nominee of the Appellant, it
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must be considered to have the same adverse interests to
the estate, which its nominor Appellant has, and therefore disqualified to act.
A very recent case which presents a very similar
situation to the one here involved is that of In the Matter
of the Estate of Eli B. Adkins (Montana 1957), 319 P.
2d 512, where the Montana Supreme Court (in interpreting a statute very similar to ours granting the surviving
wife, or ''some competent person whom she may request
to have appointed'' the prior right to administer the
estate of the deceased husband), after reviewing the authorities, including the Farnsworth Case, supra, concludes
as follows:
''These cases announce the rule applicable
here, and condemn the appointment of the widow,
or one whom she might nominate.''
A good statement on the matter is contained in Volume 2 of Bancroft's Probate Practice, 2nd Edition, Section 251, Page 67,. as follows:
''While, in limine, the surviving spouse has an
absolute right to nominate, once she accepts letters
in her own name the right to nominate another is
waived. In case of remoz-a.l for misconduct or because of an assertion of rights adrerse to the esstate, the surviving spouse of the decedent, who
has been acting as representa.tive, by having
accepted letters in 71 cr own na1ne has waived her
right to nominate atnother; and, furthermore, she
should not be permitted to nominate a. successor by
reason of the probable bias of her nominee in favor
of her adt·crse clahn." (Emphasis supplied)
22
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POINT II.
REGARDLESS OF WHETHER APPELLANT DID OR
DID NOT HAVE A PREFERENTIAL STATUTORY RIGHT
TO DESIGNATE AN ADMINISTRATOR, THE COURT
DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO APPOINT WALKER
BANK AND TRUST COMPANY UNDER THE FACTS
AND CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE EVIDENCE IN
THIS CASE.

Appellant maintains that even if the Court should determine that she in some manner waived or conducted
herself as administratrix so as to lose her preferential
right to nominate a successor, nevertheless, the Walker
Bank and Trust Company by its attempted withdrawal
of its rejection of appointment (R. 114) should have been
permitted to qualify as the administrator. However, the
authority cited by Appellant in support of this proposition does not in fact do so. Section 47 (d) of Volume 33,
C.J.S. on Executors and Administrators states that "the
question of permitting a retraction is committed to the
sound discreiton of the Court. Generally speaking,. however, retraction should not be permitted while proceedings
for appointment of another are pending." (Emphasis
supplied)
Here we have a situation where, at the time of the
attempted retraction, proceedings were pending for the
appointment of another administrator. The attempted
retraction does not state any reasons for desiring to
retract except that the bank has "had an opportunity to
more fully consider its actions with reference'' thereto.
i\Ir. Mortensen in his testimony on that matter stated
as follows:

23
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"Mr. Nielsen correctly stated to the court,
his statement awhile ago, the circumstances as
they came about between Mr. Nielsen and the Bank
and between a daughter of the decedent and the
Bank. When I, after I had talked to Mrs. Hayward
I felt that I couldn't make commitments that would
be satisfactory to her and rather than to have any
dissatisfaction on the part of some of the heirs
that I just preferred to step aside for someone
else. But I la.ter found that Mrs. Voorhees thought
that we ought to accept and if she had any prior
right of appointment that she had some say about
it also. So I decided that stepping aside wasn't
going to solve all the problems of this estate anyway. They seemed to increase rather than decrease. So I decided that maybe we could render
the estate a service by qualifying, withdrawing the
previous objection. And for that reason I ha\e
decided that if the. court sees :fit to appoint us to
take the estate we will do the best job that we can."
(Tr. 129) (Emphasis supplied)
It is therefore readily apparent that the Bank sought
only to take advantage of what it understood (apparently
from Appellant's counsel) was the preferential right of
appellant to nominate the administrator. E\en under
such circumstances, the retraction of its previous rejection was conditioned upon the court seeing :fit to appoint
the bank to take the place of :\Irs. Y oorhees. The Court
did not see fit to appoint the bank, because as the court
found, the bank had a policy against inYolYing itself in
litigation which might be necessary for the best interests
of the estate.
Under the proYisions of Section 75-7-1, U.C.A., 1953,
an administrator ''must make and return to the court ...
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a true inventory and appraisement of all of the estate of
the decedent which has come to his possession or knowledge." Likewise, Section 75-11-3 provides that the administrator "is entitled to, and must take possession of,
all the real and personal estate of the decedent, and shall
receive the rents and profits of the real estate until the
state is settled or delivered over by order of the Court.''
Under this latter quoted section, the Court has held
that it is ordinarily the duty of every administrator to
ascertain and defend the property and rights of the estate
as against any adverse claimant. In re Picot's Estate, 53
Utah 195, 178 Pac. 75. The Picot Case illustrates very
pointedly the problem which results from an administratrix asserting adverse claims to the estate. There the
wife of the decedent on being appointed administratrix
filed an inventory, the appraisement of which amounted
to approximately $25,000.00. Based upon this inventory
the Court fixed the amount owing the State of Utah for
inheritance taxes. Later the State Treasurer set up that
the decedent owned at the time of his death, certain notes
and mortgags which he had purported to assign, but which
assignment was not effective. That as a result thereof, the
estate should have included such notes and mortgages of
the reasonable value of approximately $280,000. The
trial court upon hearing the matter determined that the
administratrix, to whom the assignment of the notes and
mortgages had purportedly been made within a day or
two prior to the death of decedent, had failed to report
said property as a part of the assets of the estate when
in truth and in fact it belonged there, because said assign25
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ment had not been completed at the time of the death of
the decedent. From an order of the court including
these assets in the estate, the administatrix appealed.
The Supreme Court in noting such appeal stated:
"We remark that the appeal in this case presents a somewhat anomalous situation. Here the
administratrix of the estate appeals from a judgment which is most favorable to the estate, in that
by the judgment the assets of the estate are increased to the extent of more than $280,000.''
The Court went on to state :
"Ordinarily, it is the duty of every administrator to ascertain and to defend the property and
rights of the estate as against any adverse
claimant.
''If, therefore, the legality of the assignments
of the notes and mortgages were merely doubtful,
the administratrix should at least have obtained
the judgment of the court respecting their legality,
and should not haYe determined that question for
herself. If, therefore, the administratrix represents the estate on this appeal she manifestly is
not serving the best interests of the estate, but is
defending her own interests as against the estate.''
In the light of the testimony of l\Ir. :\Iortensen, the
trial court found ''that the "\Yalker Bank and Trust Company desired only to serve as a 'stake holder' and not to
act for the best interests of the estate as required by
law.'' This finding surely should be sufficient to justify
the trial court in refusing to allow "\V alker Bank and
Trust Company to withdraw its rejection of appointment, and in any event should justify the trial court in
26
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refusing to appoint the Walker Bank and Trust Company
under any circumstances, regardless of the right of Appellant to designate a successor.
This court has always taken the position, even where
it has affirmed a right of a person to designate a nominee,
that such right is always subject to the condition that the
right must be recognized ''in the absence of showing of
some good and sufficient reason to the contrary.'' See
In re Johnson's Estate, 84 Utah 168, 35 Pac. 2d 305; In re
Pingree's Estate, supra. We submit the evidence in the
case, and the Findings of the Court, establish that ''good
and sufficient" reason why Walker Bank and Trust Company should not be appointed administrator of the Estate.
Finally, we again call the court's attention to its decision in In re Robison's Estate, supra, to the effect that
the probate courts are and, ''as a matter of necessity must
be given a wide discretion in the conduct of estates."
A good statement of the responsibility of the appellate court in reviewing an order of the probate court
in a matter such as this is contained in Bancroft's Probate Practice, 2nd Edition, Vol. 2, Sec. 314, Page 234, as
follows:
"On appeal, moreover, every intendment is in
favor of the order of the probate court. Removal
of an administrator on a petition chargin~ neglect,
incompetency, mingling of property, etr., and the
appointment of a successor for such administrator,
should not be disturbed on appeal where the evidence is conflicting and discretion does not appear
to have been abused." (Emphasis supplied)
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the order of the trial court appointing TracyCollins Trust Company as successor administrator to
Pearl 0. Voorhees should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

ARTHUR H. NIELSEN
Attorney for Respondents
510 Newhouse Building

Salt Lake City, Utah
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